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remove the procedural weapon commonly known as a "hold up"
suit, i.e., dilatory tactics aimed at taking advantage of the fact
that there is usually considerable pressure on the condemnor
to complete the project within a limited time.
Robert W. Collings

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -OCCUPATIONAL
DISABILITY OF EMPLOYEE

DIsEAS-

Plaintiff, a sandblaster and painter continuing to perform
his duties without pain or discomfort, sought workmen's compensation benefits for disability allegedly resulting from silicosis.1
The district judge reasoned that even if plaintiff had contracted
the disease he had not become disabled by it. The court of appeal
reversed, holding that plaintiff was disabled though he could
still perform his duties without pain or discomfort. The Louisiana Supreme Court non-suited the plaintiff, and held that
since plaintiff continued satisfactory performance of his duties
with the same employer, without undue pain or discomfort,
he could not recover because there was no factual disability.
LaCoste v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779
(1967).
Factual v. Legal Disability
Louisiana's occupational disease compensation statute 2 removes the necessity of proving an "accident" in occupational
disease situations; proof of contraction of one of the listed
diseases will satisfy this requirement. Once contraction has
been proved the employee need only show resulting disability
to recover compensation benefits.8 Since the statute equates
disabling injuries with disabling diseases, the jurisprudence
1. Silicosis is one of the occupational diseases listed in LA. R.S. 23:1031.1
(1950), added by amendment, La. Acts 1952, No. 532, 9 1, which provides
in part: "A. Every employee who is disabled because of the contraction
of an occupational disease as herein defined . . . shall be entitled to the
compensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said employee received
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
"B. An occupational disease shall include only those diseases hereinafter listed when contracted by an employee in the course of his employment as a result of the nature of the work performed."
2. LA. R.S. 23:1031.1 (Supp. 1966), added by amendment, La. Acts 1952,
No. 532, 1 L
3. See MALONE, LOUSIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 218 (Supp. 1964).
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dealing with injuries provides authority for determining what
constitutes "disability" in this new area of compensation cases.4
The tendency of Louisiana's courts prior to the instant case
seems to have been to consistently hold that a worker need not
work in pain or when the performance of important functions
of employment materially increases the hazards to his health and
safety or that of his fellow employees. Under these conditions
he has been held entitled to compensation for total and permanent disability.5 In McCain v. Fohs Oil Co., plaintiff accidentally
lost his right eye while working as a derrick man. In holding
plaintiff totally disabled the court found that if the loss of an
eye hinders one's ability to perform his usual duties or subjects
him to danger by their performance he is entitled to compensation. An ironworker in Veillion v. Knapp & East7 injured
his right foot on a job which involved climbing and could no
longer climb without pain and aggravation of his injury. He was
declared totally disabled even though he worked after the accident on jobs that involved climbing. In Veillion the Third Circuit
stated that the Louisiana jurisprudence clearly holds that "if a
worker is obliged to perform his duties with pain, or increased
hazard to himself or his co-workers, he is totally disabled."
Newsom v. Caldwell & McCann9 supports the view that an
4. See, e.g., 185 So.2d 553, 559 (La. App. lt Cir. 1966).
5. Brannon v. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co., 224 La. 161, 69 So2d
1 (1953): "The law does not [require] . . . that a worker in order to make
a living, must work in pain, or that he do so when it will materially increase
... the hazards to his own health and safety ... This Is the settled
jurisprudence of all of the appellate courts of this state." Id. at 166, 69
So.2d at 8. See also Wright v. National Surety Corp., 221 La. 486, 59 So.2d
695 (1952); Morgan v. American Bitumuls, 217 La. 968, 47 So.2d 789 (1950);
Scott v. Hillyer, Deutsch, Edwards, Inc., 217 La. 596, 46 So.2d 914 (1950);
Stieffel v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938); Knispel v.
Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932); Cain v. Wilson Warehouse Co., 193 So.3d 97 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Bankston v. H. E. Wiess, 190
So.2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Flowers v. E. M. Toussel Oil Co., 190
So.2d 147 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Wells v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp., 185 So.2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Sanderson v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 181 So.2d 869 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Lavergne v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 751 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Williams v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 159 So.2d 391 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Veillion v. Knapp &
East, 158 So.2d 336 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Viator v. Hub City Contractors,
Inc., 116 So.2d 878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959); Pohl v. American Bridge Div.,
United States Steel Corp., 109 So.2d 823 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1959); Newsom v.
Cadwell & McCann, 51 So.2d 393 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); Hibbard v. Blane,
183 So. 39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
6. 6 So.2d 197 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
7. 158 So.2d 336 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
8. I& at 340.
9. 51 So.2d 393 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951). See also Sisco v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 153 So.2d 216 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Collins v. Southern Pulpwood
Ins. Co., 138 So.2d 638 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Borders v. Lumbermen's Mut.
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employee who has contracted an occupational disease should
not be forced to continue his employment to prove that he is
entitled to compensation when such continuation will endanger
his life. In Newsom the First Circuit stated that "our law does
not require a man to do what in his opinion would amount to
risking his life in order to prove.., that he is entitled to compensation."' 0
Another tendency of the Louisiana courts has been to hold
that an employee's ability to continue working following an
accident does not preclude him from being found totally disabled." The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit demonstrated
this rule in Smith v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.12 The worker

in Smith suffered a hernia yet continued work in the same
capacity, discharging the same duties, and receiving the same
pay. In declaring the worker totally disabled the court stated:
"The rule is firmly established in the jurisprudence of this
State that an employee who is unable to perform, without
substantial pain, the substantial duties of his employment
... is considered . . .as totally disabled, notwithstanding

that he has not ceased working for his employer.'18 (Emphasis added.)
In Lindsay v. Continental Cas. Co.' 4 and Carlino v. United States
Ins. Co., 90 So.2d 409 (La App. 1st Cir. 1956); Lee v. International Paper
Co., 16 So.2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
10. 51 So.2d 393, 397 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
11. See Reed v. Calcasieu Paper Co., 233 La. 747, 98 So.2d 175 (1957);
Brannon v. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co., 224 La. 161, 69 So.2d 1 (1953);
Glidden v. Alexandria Concrete Co., 132 So.2d 514 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961);
McGee v. Reiners-Schneider Co., 102 So.2d 566 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
12. 116 So.2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
13. Id. at 732. Judgment in awarding compensation was subject to a
credit for the weeks the employee continued in his employment at full
wages. This is in accord with the spirit and purpose of compensation, 4.e.,
to provide funds to sustain the injured employee while he cannot provide
for himself. See Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86
So.2d 515 (1956); Barr v. Davis Bros. Lumber Co., 183 La. 1013, 165 So. 185
(1936); Vautrot v. Maryland Cas. Co., 32 So.2d 500 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1947);
Hingle v. Maryland Cas. Co., 30 So.2d 281 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947). In Bynum
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 102 So.2d 547, 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958), the court
stated that the cases holding that "for purposes of prescription the courts
will not retrospectively assume as proven a total disability by reason of
pain during an interval at which the employee did in fact perform his
full duties" do not overrule or alter the "long established jurisprudence that
an employee unable to perform his duties without pain is totally disabled."
14. 242 La. 694, 699, 138 So.2d 543, 544 (1962): "Under the jurisprudence
it is established that a skilled worker is deemed totally disabled . .. if he
is unable to do work of the same character as that which his training,
education, and experience qualify him to perform, without unusual difficulty
or danger."
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Fid. & Guar. Co., 15 the Supreme Court followed this line of
jurisprudence by holding that an injured worker is considered
totally disabled even though the necessity of supporting his
family compels him to work in pain, discomfort, or under conditions hazardous to himself or his fellow workers. In Stieffel v.
Valentine Sugars'1 the court stated that total disability "does
not require that the insured become absolutely helpless, but
merely requires such disability as renders him unable to perform
substantial and material parts of his occupation in the usual
and customary way .... He is not to be penalized for the faithful

effort which he has made to earn a bare subsistence." 17

The main issue in the instant case is whether an employee
can recover for total disability after contracting an occupational
disease while still working at his regular job and performing
his usual duties without substantial pain or discomfort. The
First Circuit supported its compensation award by citing the
line of cases viewing an employee as totally disabled when he
can only perform his duties with danger to himself, by exposing
himself to greater danger, 18 or by aggravating his injury.19
The court relied primarily on Johnson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,20
15. 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
16. 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938) (stenographer injured his hip resulting
in a shortening of his right leg by one-half inch, causing him to experience
pain and limp). See Bailey v. Maryland Cas. Co., 34 So.2d 354 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1948).
17. 188 La. 1091, 1116, 179 So. 6, 15 (1938).
18. See notes 5-10 supra and accompanying text.
19. See note 11 supra. See also Anderson v. Continental Can Co., 141
So.2d 48 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); Braswell v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New
York, 135 So.2d 532 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Ernest v. Martin Timber Co.,
124 So.2d 205 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); Sykes v. Stout Drilling Co., 124 So.2d
200 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); Daniel v. Transport Ins. Co., 119 So.2d 107
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960); Williams v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co.,
87 So.2d 165 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Zito v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 76 So.2d
25 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Anders v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 50 So.2d
87 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); Gilmore v. George W. Garig Transfer, Inc., 33
So.2d 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948); Vautrot v. Maryland Cas. Co., 32 So.2d
500 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
20. 99 So.2d 372 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). In awarding compensation in
the instant case the First Circuit noted that an employer is not entitled to
credit against compensation liability for wages fully earned by the disabled
employee. In Lindsey v. Continental Cas. Co., 242 La. 694, 138 So.2d 543 (1962),
the Supreme Court stated that the basic test for granting credit against
compensation liability Is whether wages paid following the injury are
"presumed to be in lieu of compensation." Id. at 702, 138 So.2d at 545. See
Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d 218 (1952);
D'Antoni v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 213 La. 67, 34 So.2d 378 (1948);
Holiday v. Martin Veneer Co., 206 La. 897, 20 So.2d 173 (1944). In Madison v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 243 La. 408, 415-16, 144 So.2d 377, 380 (1926),
the Supreme Court stated: "The basic test for determining whether they
are made in lieu of compensation is whether the wages paid after the
injury are actually earned."
In previous cases the employer was given credit for the number of weeks
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which held that an employee would be considered totally disabled if, after recovering from lead poisoning, he could demonstrate that by having had the disease he was more susceptible
to a recurrence should be resume his former duties. The court
of appeal concluded that an employee need not be disabled in
fact when suit is brought, i.e., an employee is legally disabled
when it is established that the occupational disease will ultimately disable or kill him if he continues to perform his usual
duties. Citing the medical evidence, the court stated that if
plaintiff continued his present work it would "either materially
impair his health, cause serious deterioration of his general
physical condition, aggravate his disease, expose him to greater
risk of danger than that attending an uninjured workman in the
21
same field or accelerate his demise."
In denying compensation the Supreme Court of Louisiana
held that "a reading of the act as a whole shows that benefits
payable are conditioned upon an existing factual disability and
it was neither intended nor authorized . . . that an employee
would be entitled to recover . . . while he is earning his full

salary in the satisfactory performance of the very duties that
he claims he is now disabled to perform."'' (Emphasis added.)
The court interpreted "disability" to mean inability to perform
the same or similar work the employee was doing when injured,
and concluded that even though the medical evidence showed
which the employee continued to work for the employer. E.g., Wilson v.
Fogarty Bros. Transfer Co., 126 So.2d 6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Daniel v.

Transport Ins. Co., 119 So.2d 107 (La. App. OrL. Cir. 1960); Smith v. Houston
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 116 So.2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959). In Mottet v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d 218 (1952), and Meyers v.
Jahncke Service, 76 So.2d 436 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955), wages paid Injured
employees were not credited to employer on compensation awarded employee because such wages were earned while performing services different
in character to those he performed before his injury. See also MALONE,
LOUiSIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 402 (Supp. 1964); Mella v. Continental
Emsco, 189 So.2d 716 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Millet v. Pullman Co., 181
So.2d 237 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Ortego v. Cabot Corp., 180 So.2d 598
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Ledoux v. William T. Burton Co., 171 So. 795
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).

In the instant case the First Circuit noted that plaintiff was fully earning
his wages, but stated that "he is

entitled to compensation because he is

deemed disabled inasmuch as the record established by an overwhelming
preponderance of evidence that continuation in his chosen line of endeavor
is grossly inimical to his health and general welfare." 185 So.2d 553, 563

(La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
21. See 185 So.2d at 561.
22. 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779, 781-82 (1967).
23. See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 57.22, at 8, & 57.53, at

29 (1952), citing Hughes v. Enloe, 214 La. 588, 38 So.2d 225 (1948), and
Washington, v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 211 La. 690, 30 So.2d 758
(1947). See also Stieffel v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6
(1938), and Barr v. Davis Bros. Lumber Co., 183 La. 1013, 165 So. 185 (1935).
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that plaintiff's health will be impaired by continuation of his
occupation "the fact remains that plaintiff has continued to
work at the same job for the same employer without undue
pain or discomfort and, therefore, he cannot be regarded as

disabled."

24

The Peremption Issue
Claims for occupational disease disability must be filed
within four months of contraction or the date that the disease
first manifested itself.25 The Supreme Court has construed the
statute with emphasis on the word "disablement." 26 An employee
who is not in fact disabled, although he knows he has contracted
an occupational disease, need not file a claim within four months
of knowledge; the peremption period runs only from the point

of factual disability.27 In the instant case the Supreme Court
24. 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779, 782 (1967). The Supreme Court stated that
an examination of the cases cited by the court of appeal reveals that none
is applicable. See Veillion v. Knapp & East, 158 So.2d 336 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963); Johnson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 99 So.2d 372 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957);
McCain v. Fohs Oil Co., 6 So.2d 197 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942); Hibbard v.
Blane, 183 So. 39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
250 La. at -,
193 So.2d at 781 n.2: "In all of the cases cited by
the court to buttress its holding, the employees had ceased their employment at the time suit was brought because of a claimed disability. In the
Johnson case (lead poisoning) the matter was remanded for testimony on
the question of whether an employee, who has recovered from lead poisoning, will endanger his life or health by returning to his former occupation
of painting provided he uses the customary and standard precaution. The
inference in this case was that a worker is not expected to endanger his
health by a recurrence of the occupational disease after he had recovered
therefrom. However, the situation in that matter is vastly different from
that in the case at bar where the employee continues in the employment
and is not, in fact, disabled at the time he seeks compensation notwithstanding that there is medical testimony to the effect that he could
become disabled in the future and it is predicted that, should he continue,
the disease will cause his death."
25. LA. R.S. 23:1031.1(c) (1950), added by La. Acts 1952, No. 532, § 1.
26. The Supreme Court in Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La.
401, 409-10, 141 So. 9, 12 (1932), stated: "The disability should .. . be deemed
total to do work of any reasonable character . . . whenever it appears that
the employee, due to the injury, is unable to perform work of the same
or similar description that he is accustomed to perform." See also Carlino v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1954); Newsom v.
Caldwell & McCann, 51 So.2d 393 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); McCain v. Fohs
Oil Co., 6 So.2d 197 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942); Lorch v. American Can Co.
Southern, 5 So.2d 35 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941); Flanagan v. Sewerage &
Water Board, 140 So. 83 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
27. In Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d
218 (1952), the Supreme Court held that where an employee receives an
injury from an accident that later develops into disability, the right of
action is not perempted until one year after the injury has developed.
Under Mottet, therefore, the prescriptive period begins with the development of disability. In Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Co., 227 La. 941, 81 So.2d 2
(1955), and Wallace v. Remington Rand Inc., 229 La. 651, 86 So.2d 522 (1956),
the court held that the worker who continues to work in pain is not disabled
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stated that "it is only when he becomes disabled that the disease
manifests itself and the four month period runs from that time
because, unless he is disabled, he has no cause of action for
recovery of compensation." 28
Although the district court's decree 9 dismissed plaintiff's
suit with prejudice, the Supreme Court reserved plaintiff's right
to file another compensation claim when he becomes disabled
in fact.80
Conclusion
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's decision in the
instant case departs from the previous tendency to hold (1)
that if the employee's efforts to continue the same or similar work will be a source of danger he is regarded as
totally disabled; 81 and (2) that an employee need not termifor the purposes of prescription until he abandons his work because of
suffering.
Most courts and writers follow the interpretation that an occupational
disease does not "manifest itself" until the worker knows the nature -of his
affliction, knows that it is compensable, and has reason to believe that it is
causally related to his work. See especially 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-

§ 78.41 (1952), and cases cited. This interpretation was adopted in
Frisby v. International Paper Co., 76 So.2d 621 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
The court, relying on Mottet, declared that the prescriptive period does not
start running until the worker can avail himself of the benefits conferred
by the Compensation Act. In the present case the prescriptive period did
not begin until the claimant knew of the causal relation between the disease
and his job, which happened to be more than a year after the first manifestation of his symptoms and eleven months after he had become disabled.
The claimant in Bernard v. Louisiana Wild Life & Fisheries Commission,
152 So.2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writ refused, 244 La. 664, 153 So.2d
881 (1968), continued to work in pain after contracting pneumonitis. The
court stated that this disease would not be regarded as having "manifested
itself" so long as the employee attempted to continue working in pain and
suffering or under handicap.
In Ludlam v. International Paper Co., 139 So.2d 67, 70 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962), the court stated: "Therefore, an occupational disease does not 'manifest
itself' within the purview of LSA-R.S. 23:1031.1(C) until the employee has
knowledge of the connection between his disease and his employment. It
follows the prescriptive period in the instant case commenced only from
the date plaintiff became aware of the causality between his employment
and his disease." See 2 LARsoN, WORICMEN'S COMPENSATION § 95.22, at 474
TION

(1961); Annot., Limitations--Contracting Disease, 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950);
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 218, at 81-85 (Supp. 1964).

28. 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779, 782-83 (1967).
29. The district judge's opinion is discussed at 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d
779, 783 n.5 (1967).
80. 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779, 783 (1967).
31. See notes 5-10 supra. Swaney v. Marquette Cas. Co., 189 So.2d 74
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (machinist held totally disabled after accident to one
eye, even though a patch or a contact lens, which he stated that he could
not tolerate, would have given him vision a little less than normal);
Aymonde v. State Nat. Life Ins. Co., 138 So.2d 460 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
(loss of vision in one eye totally disabling to car driver); Finn v. Delta
Drilling Co., 121 So.2d 340 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (exertion on Job brought
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in order to be considered

disabled. 82

Through the instant case the Supreme Court seems to have
strayed from the "humane theory of the compensation act."
Medical testimony stated that continuance by plaintiff of his
83
present work would be detrimental to his health. The only
the right
protection awarded plaintiff was the reservation of
'84
"disabled.
becomes
he
when
claim
another
file
to
The Supreme Court's decision in the instant case may invite
falsifications by employees of pain and discomfort in instances
where continued exposure to the environment of their employment will aggravate an existing disease which may eventually
result in their death. Where medical evidence similar to that
of the instant case is undisputed, it is submitted that an employee with an occupational disease is as totally disabled as one
who works in pain or is unable to perform his usual duties.
To be declared totally and permanently disabled an employee must be (1) unable to reasonably perform the same or
similar services, or (2) unable to work without pain or discomfort, or (3) unable to work without endangering his life and
those of his fellow employees. The Supreme Court seems to have
disregarded the third basis and, instead, has established as the
crucial factor in occupational disease cases whether the employee has stopped working on the job which led to his contracting the disease.
A policy consideration which might have influenced the
Supreme Court's decision is the general belief that employees
suffering from occupational diseases should be discouraged for
their own sake from continuing dangerous employment. The
employee's chances of recovery will normally be substantially
increased by his receiving proper medical attention while not
about myocardial Infarction, depriving claimant of a small loss of reserve

heart muscle, thus increasing the hazard to his life from further exertions; regarded as totally disabling); Circello v. Haas & Haynie Corp., 116
So.2d 144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959); McKnight v. Clemons, 114 So.2d 114 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1959) (continued heavy labor would prove to be injurious to
claimant's heart condition); Trahan v. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co.,
100 So.2d 914 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) (loss of sight of one eye totally
disabling to machinery oiler); Saltzman v. Lone Star Cement Corp., 55
So.2d 674 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) (worker with sensitive foot could con-

tinue working by wearing protective clothing; compensation for total
disability denied).
32. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
33. 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779, 781 (1967); 185 So.2d 553, 555 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1966).
34. 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779, 783 (1967).
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being exposed to the hazardous conditions which produced the
ailment. Reconciling the instant case with the prior jurisprudence results in the somewhat anomalous conclusion that all the
plaintiff now has to do in order to collect compensation benefits
is to simply quit work and file a new claim. 5 It would appear,
however, more beneficial to the worker to be allowed compensation where contraction of the disease has been proven but
the employee through necessity continues to work. No worker
should be penalized for trying to earn a living, and many may
hazard certain risks for a full salary rather than the safe but
small compensation reimbursement. For example, an honest
employee who can work without substantial pain may elect to
continue work as long as possible to provide support for his
family even if it endangers his health. It is submitted that the
employee who is legally disabled should be awarded compensation regardless of whether he has continued to work.
Edward A. Kaplan
35. Brief for Appellee, p. 9, LaCoste v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 185
So.2d 553 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1966): "Accordingly, if the [plaintiff] had not
been working for the defendants at the time of the trial below there would
be no question but that [he] would be totally and permanently disabled.
Defendants point to the fact that [plaintiff was] still working and apparently
doing [his] job as well as [he] did prior to the discovery of silicosis and
hence defendants argue that [he] cannot be 'disabled' as long as [he is]
performing [his] duties. The answer to this is that the definition of
'disability' is not that a man is able to perform his work or that he 4s
actually performing the workl A man is disabled ...

if continuing to work

at the kind of work he is in would constitute (among other tests) a danger
to himself. There is no question that if Murphy [Lacoste] continued to work
that [he is] in danger."

